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CLAIMS OF POLITICAL ASYLUM BASED
ON NON-PHYSICAL FORMS OF HARM
SUCH AS ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
AND DEPRIVATIONS
Dessi Mathew
I. INTRODUCTION
Immigration matters have evoked an unprecedented level
of interest in recent years. One of the reasons for this phenome-
non has been the growing influx of asylum seekers. Some argue
that the mass exodus of people and influx of immigrants into
the U.S. is caused by major world political events, such as Fidel
Castro’s rise to power, the fall of Saigon in Vietnam, the ouster
of Aristede in Haiti and the events of Tiananmen Square, creat-
ing waves of immigrants from Cuba, Vietnam, Haiti and China
that caused the immigration debate to intensify.1  Over the last
30 years, an unprecedented number of people have sought asy-
lum in the U.S.  “As the number of asylum seekers has surged, a
public backlash against them has intensified and the war on
terror has also generated suspicion of asylum seekers.”2
However, current asylum laws and eligibility requirements
limit asylum claims to people being persecuted solely on ac-
count of their race, religion, nationality, membership in a par-
ticular social group or political opinion.3  The asylum
procedures do not recognize claims by people fleeing ethnic con-
flict, battered women or victims of cultural practices such as fe-
male genital mutilation.  Additionally, courts are reluctant to
recognize economic sanctions as persecution.4
Some scholars and political groups are advocating for the
broadening of the criteria which merit asylum.  They argue asy-
1 Katherine Tonnas, Out of a Far Country: The Sojourns of Cubans,
Vietnamese, Haitians, and Chinese to America, 20 S.U. L. REV. 295, 297 (1993).
2 Matthew E. Price, Persecution Complex: Justifying Asylum Law’s Prefer-
ence for Persecuted People, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 413, 413-14 (2006).
3 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006).
4 DEBORA E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 233 (3d ed. 1999).
309
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lum law should protect not only victims of persecution, but
other victims of violence or human rights abuse.  They claim
that limiting asylum to the politically persecuted “draws a mor-
ally arbitrary distinction among people who are similarly situ-
ated with respect to their need for protection.”5  The persecution
criteria, specifically, has been subject to a lot of criticism from
activists.  They argue that those forced to flee their homelands
because of lack of protection from generalized violence, environ-
mental catastrophe or severe economic hardship have an
equally strong moral claim to asylum as those persecuted by the
state on account of their race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group or political opinion.6  Thus, it is
clear that asylum remains a volatile political issue.  In light of
this debate, this comment will focus on political asylum claims
based on economic persecution.
In a recent decision, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit indicated that it was not able to ascertain
the standard applied by the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA), the agency which provides appellate review of decisions
by an Immigration Judge, for assessing when economic harm
amounts to persecution in the context of establishing a claim for
political asylum.7  The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),
which is the basic body of U.S. immigration law, does not ad-
dress what level of treatment constitutes “persecution” in the
context of economic mistreatment claims.  Thus, when the ap-
pellate courts decide such cases, they usually defer to the BIA’s
construction of the term. However, the BIA has not adopted a
consistent construction of the term “economic persecution.”8
Over the past 30 years, various standards have been applied.
This inconsistency is troubling as asylum seekers’ lives ride on
the resolution of these matters.  The scope of what constitutes
economic persecution is an important question in asylum
claims, and thus will be the focus of this comment.
This comment will first provide a historical overview of asy-
lum law in the United States, and an outline of the elements of
an asylum claim.  It will then analyze the scope of non-physical
5 See Price, supra note 2, at 415.
6 Id. at 417.
7 Mirzoyan v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 217, 222 (2d Cir. 2006).
8 Id.
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/9
26570_pir_21-1 Sheet No. 162 Side A      04/08/2009   15:17:04
26570_pir_21-1 Sheet No. 162 Side A      04/08/2009   15:17:04
C M
Y K
\\server05\productn\P\PIR\21-1\PIR109.txt unknown Seq: 3 26-MAR-09 13:52
2009]POLITICAL ASYLUM BASED ON NON-PHYSICAL HARM311
forms of harm which amount to economic persecution for the
purposes of establishing a political asylum claim in the United
States as outlined in seminal cases.  Several standards will be
discussed and analyzed: (1) the denial of livelihood test, also
known as the Dunat test; (2) the deliberate imposition of sub-
stantial economic disadvantage standard applied by the Ninth
Circuit in Kovac v. INS,9 and by other circuit courts including
the Fourth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit, and
the Tenth Circuit; (3) the deliberate deprivation of basic neces-
sities test as per Matter of Acosta;10 and (4) the standard in dis-
crimination claims. The comment will analyze the applications
of these standards by the various courts, and the implications
for asylum seekers.  In conclusion, it will provide support for the
argument that courts should apply a broader, less restrictive
standard. This comment will urge for widening the substantive
grounds for asylum claims by linking the eligibility require-
ments to international human rights law, so that persecution
would be interpreted to include sustained or systematic viola-
tions of human rights both in the political and economic
spheres.
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW AND U.S. LEGISLATION
The United States has long been recognized as a country
welcoming asylum seekers who are fleeing political oppression,
religious persecution or oppression by the State based on race or
ethnicity.  In fact, the United States is a party to a number of
multilateral agreements reaffirming the commitment of signa-
tories to the protection and maintenance of human rights, in-
cluding the United Nations Charter adopted in 1945, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United
Nations General Assembly in 1948, and the Conference on Se-
curity and Cooperation in Europe.11  The United Nations Char-
ter commits members to encouraging respect for human rights
and obligates members to cooperate with the United Nations for
the promotion of universal respect for, and observance of,
human rights.12  These international treaties “restate the moral
9 Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102 (9th Cir. 1969).
10 In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (BIA 1985).
11 ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 33 (2007).
12 Id.
3
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as well as the legal obligation of the civilized nations of the
world to recognize the right of every human being to live, work,
and practice one’s beliefs, free from oppressive governmental in-
terference, and to refrain from such oppressive conduct.”13
“Until the 1920s, the United States’ doors were open to al-
most all aliens, irrespective of whether they were escaping re-
ligious or political persecution” or economic poverty.14  After
World War I, various restrictions began to emerge. This trend
continued after World War II.  When Congress enacted the Dis-
placed Persons Act of 1948, the Cold War had just begun.  This
Act proposed to provide relief for those fleeing Fascist or Soviet
persecution.  “Subsequent amendments of the Act in 1950 ex-
posed Congress’ intent to use refugee law as a vehicle for the
fostering of U.S. Cold War policies.”15
In 1952 Congress passed the Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA), also known as the McCarran-Walter Act, providing
the basic framework for U.S. immigration policy; however, the
INA of 1952 did not expressly contain provisions to handle the
resettlement of refugees or displaced persons.16  In order to ful-
fill its international obligations, the United States adopted ad
hoc legislation for the immigration of refugees.17  A year later
Congress adopted the Refugee Relief Act, which furthered the
U.S. existing policy by providing relief for refugees living within
the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union or its satel-
lites.18  “Passage of this Act heralded a major change in U.S.
refugee policy.”  It was “the first time that U.S. law recognized
the existence of refugees.”19  The Act, however, created strin-
gent requirements.  Refugees had to find U.S. citizen sponsors
to serve as guarantors that the refugees would be able to find
housing and employment, and would thus not become a public
13 H.R. REP. NO. 95-1452, at 6 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4700,
4703.
14 See Tonnas, supra note 1, at 296.
15 Id. at 302.
16 Id.
17 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, History of the United States
Asylum Officer Corps, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb959
19f35e66f614176543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=62c26138f898d010VgnVCM10000048f3d6a
1RCRD&vgnextchannel=828807b03d92b010VgnVCM10000045f3d6a1RCRD#I
(last visited Feb. 24, 2009) [hereinafter History].
18 Tonnas, supra note 1, at 302.
19 Id.
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/9
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charge.  “The federal government did not provide for any reset-
tlement effort,” leaving this task to private individuals and
organizations.20
Beginning in 1956, the United States began large-scale use
of the Attorney General’s parole authority under Section
212(d)(5) of the INA to bring refugees to the United States.  In
order to allow the refugees paroled in the United States to re-
ceive permanent residency, Congress passed separate special
legislation, such as the Hungarian Refugee Act of 1958, the Cu-
ban Refugee Act of 1966, and the Indochinese Refugee Act of
1977.21  The Immigration and Nationality Act was revised in
1965 through the Immigration Act of 1965.  The 1965 amend-
ments to the INA established a permanent refugee admissions
process.  The admission requirements continued to be deline-
ated along ideological lines.  Refugees were admitted into the
United States if they fled from either communist countries or
from a country within the Middle East.22  Conditional refugee
entrants were numerically limited under a preference system to
17,400 refugees annually.23
In November of 1968 the United States acceded to the 1967
United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,
which incorporates the 1951 United Nations Convention relat-
ing to the Status of Refugees, also known as the Refugee Con-
vention.  Article 33 of the Refugee Convention prohibits a state
party from expelling or returning a refugee to a country where
his or her life or freedom would be threatened on account of a
protected characteristic.  Protected characteristics include race,
religion, and political opinions.  A “refugee” is defined in Art.
1A(2)  as any person who:
owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality
and is unable or owing to such fear, unwilling to avail himself of
the protection of that country.24
20 Id. at 303.
21 See generally, History, supra note 17.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July, 28,
1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150.
5
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In 1980 a special Refugee Act was passed by Congress, which
established statutory recognition of political asylum in Ameri-
can immigration law.
The Refugee Act of 1980 was to fulfill U.S. obligations
under the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Ref-
ugees.25  The Act created a refugee admissions system for peo-
ple outside of the U.S. and a separate procedure for resolving
claims of people already in the U.S.  The United States Asylum
Officer Corps stated:
The Congressional intent of the 1980 Refugee Act was to establish
a politically and geographically neutral adjudication standard for
both asylum status and refugee status, a standard to be applied
equally to all applicants regardless of their country of origin, and
to abandon the ideologically-motivated system in place before
1980.26
Under the Refugee Act of 1980, applicants who meet the statu-
tory definition of refugee became eligible for a discretionary
grant of political asylum by the Attorney General.27  The Refu-
gee Act codified the principles outlined in the 1951 U.N. Con-
vention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the U.N.
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.28  The U.N. Protocol
reaffirmed the principle of non-return, the right of a person not
to be returned to a country where there is a reasonable expecta-
tion the person would suffer persecution.  The U.N. Protocol set
forth the guidelines for refugee and asylum law.  The Protocol
also provided a concrete definition of the term refugee for coun-
tries to follow.29  The Congressional hearings and reports on the
Refugee Act of 1980 clearly indicate Congress’ intent to have
U.S. law conform with the Protocol in regards to the refugee
definition.30  In contrast to the Protocol’s definition of a refugee,
the U.S. definition has a more expansive meaning, and it in-
25 James M. Moschella, Osorio v. Immigration and Naturalization Service:
The Second Circuit and Well-Founded Fear of Persecution Account of Political
Opinion, 21 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 471, 476 (1995).
26 History, supra note 17.
27 Moschella, supra note 25, at 471.
28 Id. at 476-77.
29 Id. at 473-74.
30 Id. at 477.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/9
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cludes someone who has been persecuted in the past, as well as
someone who has a well-founded fear of future persecution.31
The Refugee Act of 1980 forms the basis for American polit-
ical asylum law.  It attempted to meet the humanitarian ideas
advanced by international refugee standards, and to establish
uniform criteria for determining refugee eligibility.32  Under the
Refugee act, aliens can pursue asylum or withhold deportation
when they have been caught illegally entering the United
States or residing in the United States illegally, if they meet
certain criteria.  The Act developed a new quota of 50,000 refu-
gees per year.33
In passing the Refugee Act, Congress declared that it is the
historic policy of the United States “to respond to the urgent
needs of persons subject to persecution” and to provide assis-
tance to refugees.34  The Act was also intended to establish a
systematic, equitable procedural process for asylum claims
which conformed to the spirit and ideas of the U.N. Protocol.
The President became an important force in U.S. refugee policy
through the use of the parole provisions.
In response to the Cuban Revolution of 1959 for example, Presi-
dent Kennedy paroled 60,000 Cubans into the U.S.  [Similarly],
after the fall of Saigon, President Carter . . . paroled an estimated
400,000 Indochinese into the [U.S.] in ten separate parole pro-
grams from 1975-1979.35
During the course of formulating immigration legislation, “Con-
gress . . . gradually delegated to the Executive branch much of
its authority in [the] area” of immigration law.36  Prior to 1980,
the primary goal of U.S. refugee policy was to extend relief to
those fleeing repressive regimes which the United States op-
posed.  The U.S. policy tended to react to specific political situa-
tions and to reflect ideological and geographical biases.37  The
31 History, supra note 17.
32 Moschella, supra note 25, at 475.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 476.
35 See Tonnas, supra note 1, at 305.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 306.
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Act of 1980 was intended “to remove the ideological bias from
the process regulating refugee admission.”38
Ten years later, Congress passed the Immigration Act of
1990.  This latest legislation amended the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act significantly.  Section 207 of the INA governs regu-
lations relating to refugees, and Section 208 of the INA deals
with asylum, and is also contained in 8 U.S.C. § 1158.  Under
current regulations, “[a]liens apprehended by the INS . . . [who]
are in deportation or exclusion proceedings may apply for politi-
cal asylum [in front of] an immigration judge only.”39  The im-
migration judge holds a hearing at which the applicant may be
represented by counsel.  Decisions of the judges are appealable
to the BIA, with further appeals available through the federal
judicial system.  Aliens whose applications are denied are either
deported or may be given time to depart voluntarily.  In addi-
tion to applying for relief under political asylum, an alien in de-
portation or exclusion proceedings may apply for withholding of
deportation to a particular country.  Every applicant for asylum
in such proceedings is automatically considered to be an appli-
cant for withholding of deportation.
“The standard for withholding of deportation is more strin-
gent than the standard for asylum.”40  An applicant who is
granted asylum can apply for legal permanent residence status
and eventually for U.S. citizenship.  “If the alien’s life or free-
dom would be threatened, withholding of deportation is
mandatory.  Granting of political asylum is discretionary.”41
In 1996 President Clinton signed the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act.  In one of the many
provisions, the Act expanded the definition of political opinion
to include resistance to a coercive population control program.
This provision allows a person who has been forced to abort a
pregnancy, to undergo involuntary sterilization, or who has
been persecuted for refusal to undergo such a procedure, to be
eligible for political asylum on account of political opinion.42
38 Id. at 308.
39 Id. at 310.
40 Id.
41 Tonnas, supra note 1, at 310.
42 History, supra note 17.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/9
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III. ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL ASYLUM
U.S. law provides three major forms of relief for persons
fleeing persecution or related serious harm in their country of
origin who are physically present or arriving in the United
States: asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under
the Torture Convention.  Refugee status under U.S. law is only
available to persons applying from outside of the United States.
Asylum status, in contrast, is available to persons seeking pro-
tection in the United States or at its borders.  There are no nu-
merical or categorical limitations to asylum status.43
1. Refugee
To be eligible for asylum in the U.S. under 8 U.S.C.S.
§ 1158(b)(1)(A), an applicant must be a refugee under the INA.
The INA defines a refugee in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) as
any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality
. . . and who is unable or unwilling to return to . . . that country
because of persecution or a well founded fear of future persecution
on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particu-
lar social group, or political opinion.44
The statute is based on the language of the 1951 Convention
and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees.  The
phrase “well-founded fear of being persecuted” is a key phrase
of the definition.  It replaces the earlier method of defining refu-
gees by categories to defining refugees by the general concept of
fear for a relevant motive.  Since fear is subjective, the defini-
tion involves a subjective element in the person applying for
recognition as a refugee. Therefore, the determination of refu-
gee status requires an evaluation of the applicant’s statements
rather than a judgment on the situation prevailing in his coun-
try of origin under the 1951 Refugee Convention.  The definition
incorporates a subjective and an objective element in determin-
ing whether well-founded fear exists.  This implies that it is not
only the frame of mind of the person concerned that determines
his refugee status, but that this frame of mind must be sup-
ported by an objective situation.  This definition rules out per-
sons as victims of famine or natural disaster, unless they also
43 ANKER, supra note 4, at 5.
44 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
9
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have a well-founded fear of persecution for one of the reasons
stated.45  The objective component requires credible and specific
evidence to support a reasonable fear of persecution.  One way
an applicant can demonstrate the objective grounds to justify
his fear would be to show specific human rights violations by his
government targeting individuals with similar characteris-
tics.46
The 1951 Convention makes a clear distinction between ec-
onomic migrants and refugees.  As per the Handbook on Proce-
dures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the
1951 Convention, a migrant is
a person who, for reasons other than those contained in the defini-
tion, voluntarily leaves his country in order to take up residence
elsewhere.  He may be moved by the desire for change or adven-
ture, or by family or other reasons of a personal nature.  If he is
moved exclusively by economic considerations, he is an economic
migrant and not a refugee.47
It is important however to note that the Handbook recognizes
that the distinction between an economic migrant and a refugee
is sometimes blurred in the same way as the distinction be-
tween economic and political measures in an applicant’s coun-
try of origin is not always clear.  Thus, an applicant whose
economic circumstances were a contributory factor to his deci-
sion to leave his country should not be denied asylum if he left
his home country for both political and economic reasons and
otherwise meets the requirements.48  The Handbook explains
that all circumstances need to be taken into account and notes,
“behind economic measures affecting a person’s livelihood there
may be racial, religious or political aims or intentions directed
against a particular group.”49  The Handbook also states that
where economic measures destroy the economic existence of a par-
ticular section of the population (e.g. withdrawal of trading rights
45 Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status
under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refu-
gees, U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1 (1992) (hereinafter “UNHCR Handbook”),
para. 39.
46 DAVID WEISSBRODT & CONNIE DE LA VEGA, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW:  AN INTRODUCTION 75 (2007).
47 UNHCR Handbook, supra note 45, para. 62.
48 See generally Anker, supra note 4.
49 UNHCR Handbook, supra note 45, para. 63.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/9
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from, or discriminatory or excessive taxation of, a specific ethnic
or religious group), the victims may, according to the circum-
stances, become refugees on leaving the country.50
On the other hand, the Handbook acknowledges that objections
to general economic measures by a State are not by themselves
good reasons for claiming refugee status.51
There are three ways to establish refugee status.52  First,
the applicant may demonstrate that he or she has suffered past
persecution, in which case a presumption arises that he or she
has a well-founded fear of future persecution.  Second, the ap-
plicant may establish a well-founded fear of future persecution
independent of any past persecution.53  To qualify for withhold-
ing of removal, an applicant must meet the higher burden of
showing that his or her life or freedom would be threatened in
that country because of the alien’s race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.54
Third, in certain cases, an applicant may have suffered such se-
vere past persecution as to constitute a compelling reason for
being unwilling or unable to return to his or her country.55
2. Past Persecution on Account of Race, Religion or Political
Viewpoint
Under the first prong, a refugee must show that he has suf-
fered past persecution (actual harm in his home country) by the
government or state actor on account of his race, religion, na-
tionality, membership in a particular social group or political
opinion, or has a reasonable fear of future persecution upon re-
turning to his home country.  A showing of past persecution cre-
ates a legal presumption that the applicant has a well-founded
fear of persecution and therefore should be granted asylum.56
Evidence of past persecution alone can establish eligibility for
asylum.57  Unless the INS could rebut this presumption, the
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Mirzoyan v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 217, 220 (2d Cir. 2006).
53 Id.
54 See 8 U.S.C.S. § 1231(b)(3)(A).
55 See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(ii)(A).
56 See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1).
57 Meza-Manay v. INS, 139 F.3d 759, 763 (9th Cir. 1998).
11
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alien is eligible for asylum.58  To rebut a presumption that an
alien, who had shown past persecution, has a well founded fear
of future persecution, the INS is required to show by preponder-
ance of the evidence that conditions in the country of origin of
the alien had changed to such an extent that the alien no longer
has a well-founded fear of persecution upon return to that
country.
3. Persecution as an Element
The term persecution is not defined by treaty, statute or
regulation.  There is no universally accepted definition of perse-
cution, only guidelines from various sources including the
UNHCR Handbook, precedent decisions and international
human rights law.59  The Handbook states:
From Article 33 of the 1951 Convention, it can be inferred that a
threat to life or freedom on account of race, religion, nationality,
political opinion or membership in a particular social group is al-
ways persecution.  Other serious violations of human rights—for
the same reasons—would also constitute persecution.60
The Handbook asserts that other prejudicial actions or threats
could amount to persecution depending on the circumstances of
each case, including the subjective element of fear.  The evalua-
tion requires a judgment of the opinions and feelings of the per-
son concerned.  Due to the variations in the psychological make-
up of individuals and in the circumstances of each case, inter-
pretations of what amounts to persecution will vary.  In addi-
tion, the UNHCR Handbook acknowledges that an applicant
may have been subjected to various measures not in themselves
amounting to persecution (e.g. discrimination in different
forms), but in some cases combined with other factors such as
general atmosphere of insecurity in the country of origin, would
amount to persecution.  In such situations, the Handbook ad-
vises that “the various elements involved, may, if taken to-
gether, produce an effect on the mind of the applicant that can
58 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i).
59 ANKER, supra note 4, at 19.
60 Handbook, supra note 45.
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/9
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reasonably justify a claim of well-founded fear of persecution on
‘cumulative grounds.’”61
4. Fear of Future Persecution
Alternatively, if the applicant was not subject to past perse-
cution, he may proffer evidence that he possesses a genuine fear
of enduring future persecution if returned to his country of ori-
gin and that a reasonable person would fear persecution if re-
turned to his country.62  The standard used is a “more likely
than not” standard when applied to claims based on persecution
upon the alien’s return to his country of origin.63
5. Actual Harm
The law requires that there be actual harm or a reasonable
fear of future harm, amounting to persecutory harm, in order
for an applicant to qualify as a refugee under Section
1101(a)(42) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.  United
States courts and administrative authorities have acknowl-
edged that persecution is a flexible concept, one that requires a
finding of serious harm, that is not limited to severe physical
harm.64
Actions that might constitute persecution within the mean-
ing of the asylum statute include detention, arrest, interroga-
tion, prosecution, imprisonment, illegal searches, confiscation of
property, surveillance, beatings or torture, or threats of such ac-
tion.65  The Handbook notes that persecution is related to action
by the authorities of a country, yet it could emanate from sec-
tions of the population that do not respect the standards estab-
lished by the laws of the country concerned.
A case in point may be religious intolerance, amounting to
persecution, in an otherwise secular country, where sizable
fractions of the population do not respect the religious beliefs of
their neighbors.  Where serious discriminatory or other offen-
sive acts are committed by the local populace, they can be con-
sidered as persecution if they are knowingly tolerated by the
61 UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 45, para. 53.
62 See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2) (2007).
63 Mirzoyan, 457 F.3d at 220.
64 ANKER, supra note 4, at 278.
65 See INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006).
13
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authorities, or if the authorities refuse, or prove unable, to offer
effective protection.66
6. Evidentiary Burdens of Proof and Statutory Standard
It is the alien who bears the burden of proving that he has
endured persecution or would be subject to persecution in the
future.  It is the general rule in both administrative and immi-
gration law that the party charged with the burden of proof
must establish the truth of his or her allegations by a prepon-
derance of the evidence standard.67  This is the burden of per-
suasion generally applied to aliens when seeking political
asylum or withholding of deportation.68  In order to qualify for
relief either under Section 208(a) or Section 243(h), an alien
must be able to provide objective support for his claim.69  This
objective support is required whether the standard is a well-
founded fear of persecution or a clear probability of persecution.
Also, support must be proffered to show the reasonableness of
the alien’s fear.  Additionally, the showing of fear will be judged
in light of the current foreign policy consideration of the U.S.70
7. Harm Does Not Need to Be Physical
The harm or suffering required to establish persecution in
support of an asylum claim does not need to be physical harm.
The harm may take other forms, such as the deliberate imposi-
tion of severe economic disadvantage, the deprivation of food,
housing, employment, or other essentials of life.71  Prior to
1965, the courts construed the political asylum statute, in the
context of economic sanctions, to mean a denial of employment
opportunities equal to denial of all means of earning a living.
This was a particularly difficult burden for an alien to prove.72
Section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act was
amended in 1965.  The physical harm or persecution require-
ment was deleted.  This amendment followed criticism that the
66 UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 45.
67 In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (BIA 1985).
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 See Tonnas, supra note 1, at 311.
71 Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102 (9th Cir. 1969).
72 Mirzoyan, 457 F.3d at 222.
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/9
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physical persecution requirement is too narrow.73  The amend-
ment shifted the emphasis from the consequences of oppressive
conduct to the motivation behind it.  However, Congress was
clear that only persecution on account of race, religion, nation-
ality or political opinion was to be a reason for granting an ap-
plicant political asylum.74  The legislative history of the 1965
amendment shows that Congress intended “to effect a signifi-
cant, broadening change in section 243(h) which would lighten
the burden imposed on applicants for asylum by removing the
requirement that they show threatened bodily harm.”  This in-
tent of Congress seems especially relevant in cases of alleged
economic persecution. The 1965 amendment however did not
elaborate on what form of suffering besides physical persecution
would meet the standard.
IV. THE ASYLUM PROCESS
A foreign national who seeks asylum in the United States
may do so either affirmatively or defensively.  An affirmative
applicant may be either an individual who maintains a valid
non-immigrant status (e.g. tourist status, or student status) or
a person who either overstayed his visa or entered the United
States without inspection.75  A defensive applicant is one who
applies for asylum after having been apprehended by the De-
partment of Homeland Security and placed in removal proceed-
ings in immigration court, a part of the Department of
Justice.76  A defensive applicant does not have an opportunity
to present his or her claim to an asylum officer, and has to file
the asylum application only in immigration court.  He or she is
usually detained in a detention facility after apprehension.77  A
small number of applicants are released on bond before their
immigration court hearing, but most remain detained through
their hearing and any subsequent appeal.  A successful appli-
cant is granted asylum and is not ordered to be removed.78
73 Kovac, 407 F.2d at 106.
74 Id.
75 Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Philip G. Shrag, Refugee
Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN L. REV. 295, 308-10 (2007).
76 Id. at 309.
77 Id.
78 Id.
15
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The Department of Homeland Security is the executive
agency primarily responsible for overseeing immigration
processes, including affirmative asylum applications.  The
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services houses the
asylum corps, an agency comprised of asylum officers who eval-
uate asylum applications and interview applicants.79  The inter-
view process by an asylum officer is non-adversarial. There is
no separate representative for the government.  Decisions by
asylum officers are reviewed by a supervisory asylum officer.
The asylum officer can grant asylum, refer the case to immigra-
tion court, or deny the asylum if the applicant has valid immi-
gration status, the applicant can remain in the U.S.  When an
asylum officer refers a case to immigration court, the asylum
officer serves the asylum applicant with a Notice to Appear in
court. The notice is the equivalent of a summons in a civil case,
and the asylum applicant becomes a respondent.  Immigration
court hearings are adversarial proceedings.80  A Department of
Homeland Security attorney is assigned to cross-examine the
asylum applicant and usually argues before the immigration
judge that asylum is not warranted.  Asylum decisions, whether
by asylum or immigration judges, involve both a judgment
about the applicant’s credibility, and a determination of the ap-
plicant’s eligibility.81
An applicant who is denied asylum by an immigration
judge may appeal to the BIA, which is also a component of the
Department of Justice.  The BIA consists of eleven to fifteen
members appointed by the Attorney General of the United
States.82  An asylum applicant may seek review of an adverse
BIA decision in a U.S. Court of Appeals.  The circuit courts may
remand a case in which the BIA rendered a decision contrary to
the law or abused its discretion, but the courts grant a great
deal of deference to the BIA.83
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz & Shrag, supra note 75, at 308-310.
82 Id.
83 Id.
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/9
26570_pir_21-1 Sheet No. 169 Side A      04/08/2009   15:17:04
26570_pir_21-1 Sheet No. 169 Side A      04/08/2009   15:17:04
C M
Y K
\\server05\productn\P\PIR\21-1\PIR109.txt unknown Seq: 17 26-MAR-09 13:52
2009]POLITICAL ASYLUM BASED ON NON-PHYSICAL HARM325
V. ECONOMIC PERSECUTION CLAIMS
Although the term persecution has not been defined by
statute,84 case law has described persecution as the infliction of
suffering or harm, under government sanction, upon persons
who differ in a way regarded as offensive in a manner con-
demned by civilized governments.  Civilized governments gen-
erally prohibit persecution based on race, religion, nationality,
and political opinion. This formulation was established in Mat-
ter of Laipenieks, and is also firmly based on the 1978 House
Report.85  The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Mikhael v. INS
stated that:
[T]he harm or suffering need not be physical, and may take other
forms, such as the deliberate imposition of severe economic disad-
vantage or the deprivation of liberty, food, housing, employment
or other essentials of life.86
However, administrative agencies and federal court decisions
“reflect an underlying reluctance to recognize economic sanc-
tions and deprivations as persecution” unless the harm is se-
vere or substantial.87  Minor economic disadvantages or what
the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals termed “mere economic det-
riment” in Minwalla v. INS, are insufficient to establish perse-
cution.  The applicant’s claim in Minwalla was based on a
denial of the opportunity to hold a government job.  The court in
Minwalla found that the applicant had only alleged “mere eco-
nomic detriment” which did not constitute persecution.88  Fur-
ther, the BIA has consistently held that relegation of a person
to a low economic or even subsistence level does not meet the
statutory requirement unless the government is depriving the
person of all realistic opportunity to earn a living.89
Congress has long recognized the importance of economic
rights as core human rights protected by international law.  The
House Report of August 8, 1978 notes that prior regulations
under the Displaced Persons Act described victims of persecu-
84 H.R. REP. NO. 95-1452, at 5 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4700,
4704.
85 In re T-Z, 24 I. & N. Dec. 163, 170 (BIA 2007).
86 Mikhael v. INS, 115 F.3d 299, 303 (5th Cir. 1997).
87 ANKER, supra note 4, at 238.
88 Minwalla v. INS, 706 F.2d 831, 835 (8th Cir. 1983).
89 ANKER, supra note 4, at 236.
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tion as persons or groups of persons who have been deprived of
“liberty, property or equal protection of the laws, or have been
denied the full rights of citizenship on account of race, religion
or political belief.”  The House Reports further note that the Nu-
remberg Tribunals of 1945, which prosecuted 17 Nazi war
criminals for war crimes and crimes against humanity, dis-
cussed the concept of economic persecution in great detail.  The
Nuremberg Tribunals recognized the economic aspect of perse-
cution, citing the wholesale seizure of the Nazi government of
Jewish assets and financial holdings, the imposition of extraor-
dinarily burdensome fines and the creation of Jewish Ghettos
as persecution.90
There is consensus among jurists that a person who has left
his country for both political and economic reasons should not
be barred from asylum where he has moved due to a combina-
tion of factors, including economic decisions.  Often a govern-
ment’s rationale for imposing harsh economic measures may be
political or a measure to target a specific group such as was
often the case with political dissenters in former communist
countries.  Economic measures could be directed at a ruling
party’s political opponents or ethnic groups.91  This was the case
in pre-Aristide Haiti where the government maintained its
power through extortionist behavior.92
VI. STANDARDS OF ECONOMIC HARM APPLIED BY U.S. COURTS
The BIA and federal courts have recognized that economic
sanctions can rise to the level of persecution.  Both agree that
substantial economic deprivations by a government actor affect-
ing a person’s basic ability to make a living constitutes persecu-
tion.  However, less severe forms of employment disadvantage
such as the unavailability of government jobs or being forced to
choose another, presumably comparable, occupation in order to
avoid economic sanctions, do not rise to the level of persecu-
tion.93  The BIA has also held that persecution could consist of
90 H.R. REP. NO. 95-1452, at 6 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4700,
4705.
91 ANKER, supra note 4, at 234.
92 Id. at 235.
93 ANKER, supra note 4, at 239.
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economic deprivation or restrictions so severe that they consti-
tute a threat to an individual’s life or freedom.94
1. Evolution of Standards
A. The Dunat Test: Total Deprivation of Earning a
Livelihood
Until 1965, withholding of deportation under former sec-
tion 243(h) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1964) required a
showing that the alien would be subject to physical persecution.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, for example, in Blazina v.
Bouchard, held that before the Attorney General may grant re-
lief under section 243(h), the alien must show that he would be
subject not only to persecution, but to physical persecution.
Physical persecution meant confinement, torture, or death in-
flicted on account of one’s race, religion or political opinion.  Af-
ter Section 243(h) was amended in 1965, the physical
requirement was deleted from the section and the language was
modified to read “persecution on account of race, religion, or po-
litical opinion.”95  This amendment was the result of repeated
criticism that the restriction to claims based on physical perse-
cution deprives many persecuted applicants living in police
states from relief because their harm is not physical in nature
but amounts to a deprivation from the opportunity to provide
for their families.  The legislative history of the 1965 amend-
ment provides further proof that Congress considered the physi-
cal persecution element to be entirely too narrow.96
In adjudicating claims based on economic harm, the courts
in the 1960s applied the so called Dunat standard.  The court in
Dunat held that even if the alien has not experienced physical
persecution, he would still be entitled to relief if he could show
that he would be deprived of all means of earning a livelihood,
which would amount to persecution.  BIA decisions from the
1960s invoked the Dunat standard.  This is a particularly diffi-
cult burden for an alien to meet and resulted in the denial of
relief in cases where the economic persecution was essentially
substantial harassment.97
94 Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 222.
95 Kovac, 407 F.2d at 106.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 106-07.
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In Dunat, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted
the INA’s then existing requirement of physical persecution to
include “the denial of an opportunity to earn a living.98  The ap-
plicant in Dunat was a national of Yugoslavia and a seaman.
He had jumped ship in Norfolk, Virginia in 1956 and applied for
a stay of deportation.  He introduced evidence and urged that he
would be physically persecuted if deported to Yugoslavia since
its Communist government would deny him an opportunity to
earn a livelihood because of his practice of the Roman Catholic
faith.99  His stay was denied. The Attorney General determined
that the denial of employment is not within the import of the
term physical persecution.
Dunat commenced an action in the district court arguing
that the Attorney General’s action was arbitrary and capricious,
and thus an abuse of discretion.  The district court entered sum-
mary judgment in favor of the Attorney General. Dunat ap-
pealed to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.  The Third Circuit
reversed the lower court’s judgment.  The court held that eco-
nomic proscription so severe as to deprive a person of all means
of earning a livelihood may amount to physical persecution.
The court stated that “the denial of an opportunity to earn a
livelihood in a country such as the one involved here is the
equivalent of a sentence to death by means of slow starvation
and nonetheless final because it is gradual.”100  However, mere
discrimination in employment (even if it is racially or politically
motivated) was not enough.  While reaching this conclusion, the
court essentially established a very high standard for political
asylum claims based on economic harm.  This standard is not
consistent with the principles of the Refugee Convention.  This
standard was adopted and applied by the court in Kovac v. Im-
migration and Naturalization Service decided in 1969 by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
The Dunat standard essentially means that as long as some
employment opportunity would still remain available for the
applicant, he is not eligible for political asylum, even though he
may have suffered years of racially or politically motivated em-
ployment discrimination or deprivations by the government in
98 See Dunat v. Hurney, 297 F.2d 744 (3d Cir. 1962).
99 Id. at 745.
100 Id. at 746.
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/9
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his native country.  Under this interpretation, economic sanc-
tions which were often imposed by communist authorities in the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe at the time as a means of
punishing political dissidents would not have qualified as perse-
cution for a successful asylum claim since its victims would not
be deprived of all means of earning a livelihood.
B. The Kovac Test, Probability of Deliberate Imposition
of Substantial Economic Disadvantage
So, the question remained, if an alien was subjected to sub-
stantial economic disadvantage because of his race, religion or
political opinion, is that sufficient proof of harm for relief?  Fol-
lowing the statutory change in the law in 1965, courts adopted
the Ninth Circuit’s more generous standard adopted in Kovac v.
INS known as the deliberate imposition of substantial economic
disadvantage.  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
Board’s “total deprivation of earning a living” standard was er-
roneous, and that the proper test should focus on whether sub-
stantial economic disadvantage was imposed on the alien.
In Kovac, the petitioner was a national of Yugoslavia who
had been harassed by the secret police in Yugoslavia and who,
because of his refusal to cooperate, had lost several jobs as a
chef.101  Kovac took employment in the merchant marine in or-
der to provide for his family as pressure from the secret police
made it impossible for him to find other employment.  He en-
tered the United States in 1967 as a non-immigrant crewman
on board of a Yugoslavian vessel.  He remained in the United
States after his ship departed.  Kovac applied for temporary
stay of deportation under Section 243(h) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act,102 which authorizes the Attorney General to
withhold deportation to any country in which the alien would be
subject to persecution on account of race, religion, or political
opinion.  The applicant was denied relief.
On appeal, the BIA affirmed the denial, applying the severe
economic sanctions test. The court used a standard which eval-
uates economic persecution to the point of deprivation of all
means of earning a livelihood, the standard spelled out in the
101 Id.
102 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1965).
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Dunat case.  The BIA had applied an erroneous standard, and
that such a standard is an erroneous interpretation of Section
243(h).  The Ninth Circuit in Kovac stated that “a probability of
deliberate imposition of substantial economic disadvantage
upon an alien for reasons of race, religion, or political opinion is
sufficient.”103  This test, less stringent on the applicant, was
subsequently adopted by other courts, and re-indorsed in the
1980 Refugee Act.104  According to this standard, sufficient
breaches include being compelled to take menial employment
incompatible with a person’s education and experience, and be-
ing forced to work under extremely dangerous conditions.
For example, in Berdo v. INS, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals found that the applicant presented sufficient evidence
that he had been subjected to deliberate imposition of substan-
tial economic disadvantage.  He was first demoted to a menial
job, then threatened with denial of available education and
training to secure highly skilled jobs, and then relegated to liv-
ing conditions deemed unfit for human habitation.  All actions
by the government were taken in order to compel the applicant
to join the communist party.105  However, some courts contin-
ued to rely on the old standard, with emphasis on denial of live-
lihood.  In In re D-L-&A-M-, the BIA in 1991 denied the
applicant asylum because his loss of a job in Cuba did not de-
prive him of a livelihood.106
In Borca v. INS, the Seventh Circuit stated that the appli-
cant had to show she faced the probability of deliberate imposi-
tion of substantial economic disadvantage on account of her
political opinion (the lower threshold) and not that her persecu-
tion was so severe as to deprive her of all means of earning a
living (a much higher standard).  The petitioner in Borca, a
Romanian citizen, entered the United States with a visitor’s
visa, but overstayed her status.  The INS (now USCIS) initiated
deportation proceedings against her.  Prior to the expiration of
her visa, Borca had filed an administrative application for asy-
lum and withholding of deportation in which she claimed that
103 Kovac, 407 F.2d at 107.
104 ANKER, supra note 4, at 237.
105 Berdo v. INS, 432 F.2d 824, 827, 847 (6th Cir. 1970).
106 In re D-L-&A-M-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 409, 414 (BIA 1991).
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she would likely be persecuted for her political opinion if she
returned to Romania.107
At her hearing, Borca, who was a hospital employee in the
city of Timisoara, testified that she was interrogated by the
Romanian secret police in connection with her efforts to expose
hospital officials’ purging of records and information about indi-
viduals injured or killed during the overthrow of the Ceausescu
regime.  Borca began to receive threatening calls at the hospi-
tal; the anonymous callers demanded that she destroy photo
copies of the files in her possession.  A month or two later, Borca
was subjected to another interrogation and her dwelling was
searched by the secret police.  A year later, she helped organize
a demonstration against the health minister and the Romanian
government.  Borca prepared posters for the demonstration.
She also gave a speech in which she addressed the issue of the
missing hospital records.  When she returned to work, she was
informed by the hospital director that her employment was be-
ing terminated due to her political activities.  In addition, Borca
was told that she was barred from assuming any other form of
government employment.  The secret police continued to inves-
tigate her.  Borca went into hiding and then left Romania for
the United States.108
She appealed the decision of the BIA denying her applica-
tion for asylum and withholding of deportation.  The court con-
cluded that the BIA acted unreasonably by requiring the
asylum applicant to meet a higher standard, and that the Board
failed to heed Congress’ intent as expressed in an amendment
adopted to lessen the burden on asylum applicants.
C. Discrimination as Persecution
Discriminatory treatment in the exercise of rights such as
education and housing may constitute persecution where the
harms are severe, pervasive, and cumulative in number or in-
tensity over time.  Isolated and sporadic occurrences do not sat-
isfy the severe and pervasive standard.  In addition, the
applicant must establish a failure of protection by his govern-
ment.109  The government must either be actively promoting the
107 Borca v. INS, 77 F.3d 210 (7th Cir. 1996).
108 Id.
109 ANKER, supra note 4, at 243.
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discrimination or becoming complicit with it.  In several cases
involving Chinese nationals, the BIA has ruled that a denial of
educational opportunities, in addition to other factors, rises to
the level of persecution. In re Chen, which concerned an appli-
cant who had suffered humiliations and banning from school as
a result of his father’s position as a minister during the Chinese
Cultural Revolution, the BIA found that the persecution re-
quirement was met.
The INS’s instructional materials describe numerous forms
of discriminatory harm as rising to the level of persecution in-
cluding arbitrary interference with a person’s privacy, family,
home or correspondence; deprivation of all means of earning a
living, relegation to substandard dwellings; exclusion from in-
stitutions of higher learning; passport denial; constant surveil-
lance; and pressure to become an informer.  Discriminatory
harms are often evaluated cumulatively or in combination with
physical or other forms of abuse, so that the persecution is
judged in the totality of the mistreatment.110  In a decision pre-
dating the 1980 Refugee Act, the BIA found that deprivation of
professional opportunities could constitute persecution, where
it is part of a systematic and extensive campaign of discrimina-
tion against a religious minority.111
D. Matter of Acosta - Deprivation of Basic Necessities
Test
The formulation in the 1978 House Report also alludes to a
deprivation by a government actor of basic necessities of life.
The Report states that:
[T]he harm or suffering need not only be physical, but may take
other forms such as the deliberate imposition of severe economic
disadvantage or the deprivation of liberty, food, housing, employ-
ment or other essentials of life.112
The second prong, focusing on the deprivation of basic necessi-
ties was applied by the BIA in 1985 in Matter of Acosta.113
110 Id. at 244.
111 Id. at 245.
112 H.R. REP. NO. 95-1452, at 5 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4700,
4704.
113 Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 222.
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Some suggest that the substantial economic disadvantage test
is somewhat broader than the Acosta formulation.
Both the Acosta formulation and the House Report use the
term “severe” in describing the threshold level of harm required
for a successful claim of persecution.  The House Report’s refer-
ence to the term “deliberate imposition of severe economic dis-
advantage” tracks the Kovac test for economic persecution, but
the court in Kovac substitutes the term “severe” for “substan-
tial.”114  The House Report also recognizes that “the deprivation
of liberty, food, housing, employment or other essentials of life”
may amount to persecution.  So, the two tests, the Kovac test
and the Acosta test should be applied as both reflecting the
House Report principles.
VII. CONCLUSION
Although it is difficult to reconcile the results in many of
the BIA and federal court decisions, the factor of a government’s
discriminatory intent is a distinguishing one. Courts seem to
waiver between the two parts of the Kovac standard: “deliberate
imposition” (intent) and “substantial economic disadvantage”
(severity of the harm).115 In some cases, economic harms that
qualify for relief are part of a pattern of discrimination. Yet,
case law is clear that persecution for asylum requires a showing
of more than mere economic discrimination.
Courts inconsistently apply these various standards, which
is troubling because denial of the relief sought leads to deporta-
tion.  Deportation is a drastic sanction capable of destroying
lives and disrupting families.  Some courts erroneously continue
to rely on the old Dunat standard with emphasis on “denial of
the opportunity to make a living,” without acknowledging the
change adopted since the Kovac decision and the 1980 Refugee
Act.  This misstatement of the law is largely a failure to articu-
late the conceptual shift.  Congressional intent is clear that an
applicant does not need to demonstrate a total deprivation of
livelihood or a total denial of all economic opportunity in order
to be granted asylum relief.
114 In re T-Z, 24 I. & N. Dec. 163 (BIA 2007).
115 ANKER, supra note 4, at 242.
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Judges should refer to the 1978 House Report formulation
for guidance in each determination.  The House Report ex-
presses the intent of Congress to use a threshold test of severe
harm or deprivation.  The House Report’s use of the term “se-
vere disadvantage” as the benchmark for the level of economic
harm is consistent with the Refugee Convention principle that
persecution is an extreme concept and does not cover every mi-
nor government infringement.  The Kovac standard, closely par-
allels this intent of Congress, and has been adopted by a
number of federal courts including the Second Circuit, the
Fourth Circuit, Sixth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit and the
Tenth Circuit.  By focusing on the “deliberate imposition of sub-
stantial economic disadvantage,” the Kovac standard suggests a
standard that is more flexible, yet legally sound.  It encom-
passes breaches that do not amount to deprivation of all means
of earning a living.  The Kovac test covers claims based on ex-
traordinary severe fines or wholesale seizures of assets.
It is clear from case law that where economic sanctions
have a political, racial or disfranchising impact on its victims,
they should be able to qualify for relief, as that seems to be at
the core of the principles of the Refugee Convention and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  The eligibility re-
quirements should be linked to international human rights law.
Considering that economic and related social rights, such as the
right to work and earn a living mentioned in Article 23 of the
Universal Declaration, are among the main human rights pro-
tected by international law. When a State seriously infringes on
the individual’s exercise of these rights, persecution should be
established, especially when economic harms are a pattern of
discrimination.  Courts should apply a liberal interpretation
that affords aliens the most protection since the language of the
relevant asylum statute does not provide a fixed definition of
the key term persecution.  This would be consistent with the in-
tent of Congress as expressed in the 1978 House Report to per-
mit maximum flexibility with respect to each individual
determination.
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/9
